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In 1970, William Poole ( 9) published a theoretical ana.1.ysis showing
that in a comparative static f'ramework, the superiority of an interest rate
target or a money supply target as a monetary policy rule depended upon the
source of disturbances to the system. Poole's work has had considerable
impact upon the actual conduct of monetary policy. Under the leadership
of the present Federal. Reserve chairman, the Federal Open Market Committee
has generally specified to the Trading Desk a monetary aggregates target
constrainedbyan allowable range in the Federal funds rate. However, during
times in which disturbances were perceived as originating primarily in the
monetary sector, the Committee has reverted to a pure interest rate
target. The rational for target selection related to the source of dis-
turbances follows directly from Poole's analysis.
This study examines the extent to which Poole1s conclusions are
applicable in a considerably more complex, dynamic macroeconomic system,
rather than in his comparative static framework. Evidence is also offered
as to how his results may be affected by changes in some of the more important
parameters of the economy.
In the present study, alternative monetary rules are tested using
computer simulation of' the time path of' a twelve-equation q,uarterly model
of' the economy, which is subjected to exogenous disturbances in either the
expenditure or monetary sectors. The model is similar to that developed
by Blinder and Solow (3) except that it incorporates an endogenous money
supply, endogenous price determination, and both recognition and impact
lags in monetary policy. The price function is an inflationary-expectations-
augmented Phillips Curve of' a type similar to that developed by Laidler (6).2
Both constrained and unconstrained versions of money suppl~· and
interest rate rules are tested in different economic environments, including
Keynesian and Monetarist interest elasticities, differing monetary policy
impact lags, and zero or positive autocorrelation of disturbance terms. Two
analysis ofvariance techniques are used to compare mean variances of real
output and the price level in determining relative superiority among rules.
All active rules are compared with each other and with a control policy
representing a complete absence of open market operations.
The results of the simulation tests modify significantly Poole's
comparative static conclusions. Due to the existence of recognition and
impact lags, a rule recommended by Poole as appropriate for a particular
disturbance may actually exacerbate the variance of real output. In such
a case~ imposing a constraint on the rule can change its effects from de-
stabilizing to stabilizing.
Relative rule performance is found to be sensitive to the interest
elasticities of private expenditures and money demand; to the presence or absence
of positive autocorrelation of the disturbance terms; and to the source of the
disturbances. Rule performance is not affected by the length of the impact
lag. Effects of a given rule on real output and the price level are not
always similar~ in that some rules increase the variance of one while reducing
the variance of the other.
II. The Model and Monetary Rules
A. Model Structure
The quarterly model used in this study (Table I) is a modified and
extended version of the Blinder and Solow model. It contains expenditure
and monetary sectors with wealth effects on both the demand for goods and3
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E/P = Real Private Expenditures
G/P = Real Government Expenditures
G = Real Exogenous Government Spending
B = Number of Government Bonds in Private Holdings (Each Bears a
One Dollar Coupon)
TIP = Real Tax Receipts
YIP = Real Private Income
W/P = Real Wealth
r = Real Rate of Interest
e[P-:~:-zJ = Expected Rate of Inflation
Md/P = Demand for Real Cash Balances
Hs/P = Real Money Supply
HIP = Real Monetary Base (High-powered Money)
W= Real Physical Wealth
XI? = Real National Output
* (X/p) = level of Real Output at Which Prices are Stable
P = General Price Level
E = Stochastic Disturbance to Expenditure or Monetary Sector
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ror money, a government budget constraint, endogenous price level determination,
and a means to inject active monetary policy. The model is characteristically
short run, with no capital accumulation.
The first four equations describe the market for goods and services,
which is assumed to clear in each period. Equation 1 is aggregate private
demand, which is a function of disposable income, lagged wealth, the lagged
real rate of interest, and a stochastic disturbance term. Equation 2 specifies
that government demand for goods and services consists of' an autonomous
component and interest on the stock of interest-bearing government debt held
in private hands. Equation 3 is the tax function, and Equation 4 is the
market clearance condition.
Equations 5. 6, and 7 describe the monetary sector. The demand for
money is a function o'f disposable income (a proxy for private transactions),
wealth, the nominal rate of' interest, and a stochastic disturbance term.
The supply of' money is a function of' the monetary base and the nominal rate
of' interest. An endogenous money supply implies that the monetary authority
does not control the money supply exactly, but can, by forecasting the
nominal rate of' interest and adjusting the base, seek a money supply target.
Alternatively, it can adjust the base to seek a market-determined interest
rate target to its liking.
The monetary sector affects the goods and services sector through
wealth and interest rate changes in Equation 1. Since these arguments are
lagged, monetary sector effects on the demand for goods and services, and
hence on aggregate output, are also lagged. On the other hand, expenditure
sector changes aff'ect the monetary sector without a lag, through disposable
income.6
Equation 8 defines privately-held real wealth as inclusive of
"outside" or high-powered money, interest-bearing government debt, and a
fixed stock of physical wealth.
Equation 9 is the government budget constraint, specifYing that
any budget deficits must result in issuing a like quantity of high-powered
money or debt. Conversely, budget surpluses must result in retiring debt
or money.
Elluation 10 is the monetary authority's policy instrument. Monetary
policy consists entirely of open market operations. By specii'ying "f", an
increase or decrease in the stock of high-powered money is determined. Given
the government surplus or deficit and the change in the stock of high-powered
money (determined by monetary policy) the change in the stock of interest
bearing goverronent debt is :f'ul.ly determined by equation 9.
Equation 11 subtracts the transf'er payment~ interest on the
government debt, hom aggrega.te income to obtain aggregate output. In the
model, the goverronent pays interest only on debt held in private hands.
If' the monetary authority retires debt through its open market opera.tions,
such debt ceases to exist. In ef'fect, the monetary authority is considered
to be a part of' the government.
Equation 12 speci~ies the price f\Ulction, which is essentially a
shif'ting Phillips curve. The rate of inflation is a function of' the expected
rate of' inf'lation and the deviation of' real output in the previous period
£'rom that level at which prices are stable. The function uses real output
as a proxy f'or the rate of resource utilization.
The expected rate of' inflation is some fraction~ e, of' last period's
rate of inf'lation. The expected rate might also be specified as a weighted
sum of past weights; but in the interest of' simplicity, only the immediately7
preceding period is considered. If u'e = 1, the price function is simply
the natural rate hypothesis in a no-growth econom;y-. assuming a negative
I"inesr relationship between output and unemplo:rment. If 0 < u·e < 1 (as
is assumed in the simulation tests), a trade off between inflation and
unemployment persists in the long run, though on less favorable terms than
in a short-run Phillips Curve.
B. Stability
All tested versions of the model are stable under either money
or debt financing of government deficits. However, if the interest elasticity
of the monetary sector is reduced, the model becomes unstable with
either debt or money financing of deficits.
This result is at variance with Blinder and Solow's conclusion,
based on a similar model,that money financing of deficits always results
in stabilitY.l! The difference can be traced to Blinder and Solow's use
of a simult'9Jleous model in instantaneous time rather than a model in discrete
time containing internal lags. In the latter case, even though the system
may necessarily reach its neW equilibrium level of output under money
financing, the existence of internal lags causes overshooting. This intro-
duces the possibility that the system maybe unstable in cycles of ever-
expanding amplitude about the new equilibrium.
Such instability was achieved in the present model by simply re-
ducing the interest elasticity in the monetary sector, and suggests that Blinder
and Solow1s stability conclusions are strictly applicable only in a system
without lags. Yet, this also implies that at least some of their stability
conclusions are of academic interest only, since empirical studies indicate
that the economy is replete with lagged effects.
1/ See Blinder and Solow (2), pp. 50-52 and (3) pp. 327-329.8
c. Monetary Rules
Four active monetary policy rules are tested in the study. The
first is simply a fixed money supply rule, which targets the nominal money
supply at its steady state value.y This rule in a zero growth economy is
analogous to FriedmanI s rule of a constant rate of growth of money in a
growing economy and consequently is labeled the "Friedman rule." The
present test is simply a special case of his policy prescription, in which
rates of growth for both the economy and the money supply are equal to
zero.
The second rule targets the real rate of interest at its steady
state value•.l! It is tempting to identify this rule with a nec_Keynesian
prescription, since this school of economic thought has in the past
emphasized interest rate and credit market conditions as the appropriate
measures of monetary policy. However, since they typically have not dis-
tinguished between real and nominal interest rates in the 1itera~ure, a
real rate target does not necessarily reflect their views.
The third and fourth rules are similar to those proposed by Pierce (8)
and are simply constrained versions of the first two rules. The rule designated
"Pierce-Mil targets the nominal money supply at its steady state value,
subject to the constraint that the real rate of interest may not change by
more than a specified number of basis points in each period (Iarl< 10 basis
points per quarter in the tests). The rule designated "Pierce-r" targets
the real rate of interest at its steady state value,subject to the constraint
that the nominal money supply may not change by more than a given percentage
Y Balbach and Karnosky (1) argue convincingly that the real money supply is not
an appropriate target for stabilization policy.
:l/ The nominal rate of interest is not an appropriate target, since it includes
the expected rate of inflation. An increase in inflation would increase
inflationary expectations and the nominal rate of interest.. A policy of
targeting the latter would necessitate increasing the money supply--further
exacerbating the inflation, leading to a further increase in the money supply,
in self-reinforcing dynamics.9
in each period (Ill.~I < an absolute annual rate of change of 2 percent). Both
of these rules simply constrain the vigor with which the monetary authority
can pursue its policy operations. They allow for the possibility that in
a stochastic system in which the monetary authority does not have perfect
foresight and does not have exact control over the targets, it may be
preferable to pursue policy operations which will only partially close the
gap between actual and desired levels in any giv~n period.~
Each of the four rules is tested and compared, not only with the
others, but also with a rule of total inactivity, one in which f = a in
all periods, so that the nominal monetary base remains fixed at its steady
state value. In a growing economy, such a rule would be analogous to the
monetary authority's causing the nominal monetary base to grow continually
at a constant rate, without regard to the money supply, interest rate,
or other rluctuating economic conditions.
A recognition lag or one period is incorporated into the
implementation of' each of the four active rules. The monetary authority
observes a deviation of the targeted variable from its desired level in
the period just past, then calculates the change in high-powered money
(a value for "f") needed to return the variable to its desired level in
the current period. In the tests of constrained rules, the change in the
high-powered money is limited by the constraint, whenever the latter is
effective.
The incorporation of a recognition lag significantly improves the
model's representation of the actual conduct of' policy. Consequently, the
~ The Federal Open Market Committee typically follows such a procedure with
respect to money supply targets. For example, if the money supply grows
too rapidly in any period, a policy is adopted which is designed to return
it gradually to the targeted level over the course of several periods,
rather than pursuing an immediate and complete correction.10
results of the simulation tests should be of greater interest to policy
makers.
The policy equations for calculating the desired change in high-
powered money necessary to implement each of the rules are given in Equations
13, 14, and 14b.
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The equations are derived by taking the total differential of the
monetary sector and combining it with the monetary policy equation of the
model.1! Since these equations are derived from a differential and yet are
used to approximate a discrete change of' a nonlinear function, they are
not exact. However, in a number of simulation tests to check their validity,
21 Since the lagged variables in equation 1 isolate the real sector from
current period changes in the monetary sector, the model is partially
decomposable. Policy changes in the stock of high-powered money have
no immediate impact outside the monetary sector; hence, the total
differential of this sector is sufficient to solve for the desired
change in the monetary base to target either the money supply or the
rate of interest. Mathematics of the derivation are available from
the author upon request.11
the calculated value of "f" caused a change in the targeted variable which
was within five percent of the desired change in all instances and was
usually within two percent. For the Pierce-r and Pierce....M rules, the
appropriate constraint was appended to the equations.
III. Simulation Procedure and Parameter Selection
A. Simulation
In the simulation tests, the system is initially at long-run
equilibrium values. A random disturbance is then applied in each period,
beginning with the first period. For any given test, the disturbance is
applied to either the expenditure sector (equation 1) or the monetary sector
(equation 5), is normally distributed with a mean o:f zero, and may have
either zero or positive autocorrelation. The standard deviation of the
disturbance ter:m is varied across tests of different economic parameters in
order to produce an approximately equal impact on the monetary sector
regardless of the system parameters. Thus the monetary authority has the
same magnitude of task in attempting to target the money supply or interest
rate regardless of the specific parameters of the economic system being
tested.
The disturbances push the economy off its long-run
equilibrium path, and the monetary authority responds by changing the stock
of high-powered money an amount calculated to return the targeted variable
to its long-run equilibrium. value. The monetary authority will not in
general achieve its target, since unknown current period values of cis-
posable income, the price level, and a new disturbance term will aff'ect
the monetary sector in addition to the policy operation.12
Each simulation test is run for fifty periods; at the end of
which, the variances of real output and the price level are computed. Each
run is repeated fifty times for each economic environment (a given set of
parameters), thus generating sets of 50 sample variances of real output
and the price level for each environment.
B. Parameters
The rules are tested in sixteen different economic environments,
corresponding to all combinations of varying four different parameters.
The four parameters are:
(1) "Keynesian" or "Monetarist" interest elasticities. The
Keynesian environment has a relatively high interest elasticity
of money demand (-.8) and low interest elasticity of private
expenditures (-.1). The "Monetarist" environment has low money
demand interest elasticity (-.2) and relatively high private
expenditure interest elasticity (-.4).. Interest elasticities
were chosen from among plausible values to provide a
reasonable degree o~ contrast between the two environments.
(2) Positive (p=.8) or zero autocorrelation of the disturbance
terms. Previous simulation tests, such as those of Cooper
and Fischer (4), have not considered positive autocorrelation
of disturbances. However, experience suggests that such is
likely.
(3) Disturbances in either the expenditure or monetary sectors.
Poole's analysis concluded that a money supply target would
be superior for expenditure disturbances, while an interest
rate target would be superior for monetary disturbances.13
(4) An impact lag of the monetary sector on the goods and services
sector of either two quarters or four quarters. Friedman
has often suggested that long and variable impact lags may
cause discretionary monetary policy to be destabilizing.
While discretionary policy, per se, is not tested in the
simulations; the effects of differing impact lags on
the performance of monetary rules might prove to be interesting.
Values of parameters and steady state values of endogenous variables
were selected from U.S. data and existing econometric studies to approximate




Two criteria are considered in evaluating rule performance--the
variance of real output and the variance of the price level. Each of' the
active policy rules is compared with the control policy of no change
in high-powered money. If the variance of real output is smaller than that
of the control policy at a statistically significant level of .95, then the
active policy is considered to be stabilizing with regard to reel output.
Similarly, an active policy is stabilizing with respect to prices if the
variance of the price level is smaJ.ler than that of the control policy at
a significance level of .95. Conversely, a rule m8lf also be inferior with
respect to the control policy if the variance of real output or the price
level is significantly larger.
Comparisons were also made between active policies. If one policy
results in smaller price or output variance than all other policies at a14
confidence level of .95, then such a policy is identified as the best for
that criterion.
No attempt was made to develop an objective function which would com-
bine the two criteria. Thus~ it is possible for a rule to be stabilizing with
regard to real output variance and inferiOr with regard to price level variance)
or vice versa.
Two multiple analysis of variance techniques, developed by Dunnett
(5) and by Tukey (10), are used for the statistical analysis. The Durtnett
test simultaneously compares each active policy with the control policy,
while the Tukey test compares active policies with each other. Prior to
calculation of the appropriate confidence intervals, the sample variances
are- transformed into their natural logaritims in order to better satisfy
certain assumptions. Naylor, Wertz, and Wonnacott (7) contains a useful
discussion of these analysis of variance techniques and the data transformation.
B. Comparative Rule Performance
Tables III and IV indicate the qualitative results of the tests.
The appendix contains similar tables, providing the respective numerical
values.
1. Ei'fects on Real Output
Since Poole's analysis was conducted in a fixed-price model,
only the effects on real output in the tables are comparable with his
results. In the Keynesian economy (Table III), Poole's results are sub-
stantiated by the simulation tests only when the disturbance is positively
autocorrelated and originates in the monetary sector. Under such circumstances,
an unconstrained interest rate rule is clearly superior to all others, while
a money supply target is actually worse than the control policy of doing
nothing at all.TABLE III
KEYNESIAN ECONOMY
Active polIcy rules are compared with a control policy of fixing the nominal monetary base
(an absence of open market operations). US" denotes stabilizing and means that the active policy
produced a ·smaller real· output or price level variance than the control policy. 111 11 denotes .
lllnferlor" and means that the active policy produced a larger real output or price level variance
than the control policy. 115.11 denotes the best policy for a real output or a price level cri-
terlar in a particular economic environment.TABLE IV
MO~.IARIST ECONOMY













































































Active policy rules are compared with a control policy of fixing the nomlnal.monetary base (an
absence of open market operations). liS" denotes stabilizing and means that the active pol tey produced
a smaller real output or price leve) variance than the control poll-cy. tt.lll-denotes Hlnfedor" and means
thit the active policy produced a. larger real output or price level variance than the control policy.
liS II denotes the best pol icy for a real output or a price level crl terlon in a particular economic
environment.17
In most of the remaining Keynesian economic environments, no active
policy rule performed significantly different from the control policy. The
exception is an interest rate rule with non-autocorrelated disturbances
in the monetary sector. While Poole's results indicate that such a rule
shouldbe the best choice to combat monetary disturbances t the simulations
show that in this instance the rule actually performs worse than the control
policy of complete inactivity. The monetary authorit~r's efforts at stabilizing
actually result in destabilizing, in the sense that the variance of real out-
:put is increased from what it would otherwise be in the total absence of
monetary policy operations.
With regard to real output effects in the Monetarist economy (Table IV) I
the money supply rules, Friedman and Pierce-M, in general appear to have
stabilizing effects when disturbances come from the expenditure sector. This
is in agreement with Poole I s analysis. However, with monetary sector dis-
turbances, no active pOlicy rule is able to have a stabilizing effect on the
economy. In fact, the unconstrained interest rate rule, which Poole I s analysis
indicates is the preferred policy for money demand disturbances, actually
has a destabilizing effect upon real output.
In attempting to track down the source of these perverse effects of
the interest rate rule, it was noted that with positively autocorrelated
monetary sector disturbances, the Pierce-r constrained interest rate rule
provided results which were little different from the control policy. A
plausible hypothesis is that the unconstrained interest rate rule identifies
the correct target variable, but simply pursues it too vigorously. In the
presence of recognition and impact lags, attempting to return the target
variable to its desired level in one period may actually induce a greater
real output variance.18
To investigate this hypothesis, the simulation tests of monetary
sector disturbances in a monetarist economy were rerun using a half-force
interest rate rule. In employing this rule, the monetary authority changes
the stock of high-powered money an amount calculated to close only one-half
of the gap between actual and desired levels of' the target variable. This
constraint on policy is a stronger constraint than that employed in the
Pierce-r rule.
The quantitative results of this simulation are contained in
Table A- 6 of the appendix. With positively autocorrelated monetary sector
disturbances, the half-force interest rate rule has a stabilizing effect
on real output. Thus, by constraining a Poole-recommended rule, destabilizing
effects were transformed into stabilizing ones.§!
This suggests that Poole's conclusions provide only a first step
toward deYi.sing a monetary rule to stabilize real output. Even if the monetary
authority knows the source of disturbance, and therefore the appropriate
target variable, pursuing a monetary rule may nevertheless act as a destabilizing
force on the economy. In the presence of recognition and impact lags, it may
be necessary to constrain policy to only partially close, in any one period,
the gap arising between actuaJ. and desired levels. Identifying the appropriate
speed with which to close the gap adds a difficult quantitative dimension
to Poole's qualitative conclusions, even in the simple case of only a single
source of disturbance to the economy.
2! With no~-autocarrelated disturbances, the half-force interest rate rule
does not succeed in producing stabilizing effects, however. Throughout
the tests, due to the recognition lag of policy, rule performance proved
to be less effective when disturbances were not autocorrelated. It is
probable that a more severely constrained interest rate rule would have
been stabilizing even in this case, but no search for the appropriate
degree o:f restraint was undertaken.19
2. Effects on the Price Level
For price level stability,an unconstrained interest rate rule is
significantly better than all other rules whenever the disturbance arises
in the monetary sector. This is true regardless of whether the economy is
Keynesian or Monetarist, whether there is zero or positive autocorrelation,
andwhetherthere exists a two-quarter or four-quarter impact lag.
Comparative rule performance with regard to price level stability
is much less clear_cut ror expenditure disturbances, however. In the
Keynesian economy, no active rule yields results which are significantly
different from the control policy; while in a Monetarist economy with auto-
correlated disturbances, all active rules have a stabilizing eff'ect relative
to the control policy. In general, the Friedman Rule and its Pierce-M
constrained version have stabilizing effects on the price level in the
greatest number of economic environments for expenditure disturbances,
although the interest rate rule is not far behind.
It is interesting that in some instances, a rule which has "inferior"
or destabilizing effects on real output, mS¥" nevertheless have stabilizing
effects on the price level. This paradox can be explained by examination
of the price formation function. The variance of the price level is dependent
not only on the variance of real. output, but also on the degree of positive
autocorrelation of" the latter relative to its steady state value. A high
degree of positive autocorrelation of real output permits the shifting
Phillips Curve relationship to shift upward or downward quite far, thus
increasing the variance of the price level. Thus, while a rule may increase the
variance of real output, if it simultaneously decreases the degree of positive
autocorrelation of real output relative to its steady state vaJ.ue, the net
effect mS¥" be to reduce the variance of the price level.20
V. Conclusions
These simulation tests indicate that in the presence o~ recognition
and impact lags, even a relatively passive, nondiscretionary monetary policy
that simply targets either the money supply or the rate of' interest according
to the source of disturbance, may nevertheless be destabilizing. In a recent
exchange with Mbdigliani, Friedman explicitly recognizes this problem when
he suggests that recognition lags can cause even a money supply rule such
as he favors to do more harm than good.
• • • a policy of discretionary movement in an instrument
can lead to worse results than stability in it, if' there is enough
lack of correlation between the actions taken and the actions that
should be taken, even though2 on the average, those actions are in
the right direction. • • • If you know there is So lO-percent decline
in the quantity of money, you can of'fset it--of' courseI But what
you really have to demonstrate is that, over time, you will in
fact know enough about such changes and will be able to identif)t
them. soon enough, so that you can make adjustments which, on the
average, will do more good than harm.7/ (Emphasis added.)
While Poole's analysis relating the optimal. choice of rule with-
the source of disturbance seems to be incontrovertible in a comparative
static system, it may actually encourage destabilizing policy actions in
a dynamic system containing recognition and impact lags. In the presence of
lags, it is likely to be pref'erable f'or policy to aim at only partiaLly closing
the ga.p between a.ctual and desired levels of the target variable in any one
period.
Rule perf'ormance is not affected in these tests by the length or
the impact lag. This, however, is not evidence that purely discretionary
policy would be similarly unaffected. In the simulation tests, the impact
7/ Discussion by Milton Friedman of' a paper by Franco Modigliani
in "The Monetarist Controversy: A Seminar Discussion," Economic Review
Supplement, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Spring 1977, pp. 25-26.21
lag does not lie between a policy operation and its target (the money supply
or interest rate); whereas, with purely discretionary policy, the impact lag
does lie between a policy operation and its target (the rate of unemployment
or inflation). In the latter instance, the length of' the impact lag is
likely to be important.
The siJIiulation reslllts do not provide overwhelming evidence in
support at a Friedman-type money supply rule. In fact, onl.y under circumstances
of' expenditure sector disturbances in an economy with characteristically
Monetarist interest elasticities does such a rule prove to be s~abilizing.
In fairness to his position though, it should be noted that this is'precisely








Va lue . Elasticity Value Elasticity
a 200 400
d 2000 E(r) = -.1 8000 E(r) =-.4
9 178 28
• 4700 Md(r} = -.8 950 Md(r} = -.2
TABLE A-3
EQUILIBRIUM VALUES OF VARIABLES
x = 1000 W= 4000
P = B - 12
y - 1012 H = 100
E - 800 M = 250
5
G = 212 M d = 250
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(5) "" Stabilizing at a confidence level of .95.
(I) m Inferior at a confidence level of .95.
The control policy fixes the nominal monetary base. Values are the means of the natural logs of the
variances of real output and the price level. All price level values have a negatIve sign. Indicating




Effect on Real Output Effect on Price Level·
~ , , e .~ ~
.....- IU ~
~Q'" .... U '"
~
~ o e >-. ~- e ~ "
~
~ .... ~ •
~-' ~ , • , ,
~- e • ~ " o 0 u ~.o • 0>- ~" e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o >-
~ , • , ,
u e o ~ ~>- ~ u ~ -a- u- u_ ~ u ~" e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o e • ~ , ~ u ~ .- ~ ~ ~ , ~ , ~ , .,.- ~ -a- u- u-
~o.o u~ e ._ e- ~ ~ .- " ~" ~" e_ ~ ~ ~ , ~ , ~ ,
:J .- L ~. 0- 00 e • ~ o 0 ~~ .- " ~" ~" «~, V> .-
" 0
W 0. -" ... 0. 0. wo. e • ~ .-
~ Q 0. -" ... 0. 0.
None E 2 7.81 9.13(1) 7.70 8.05 7.74 10.74 1\.13(S) 11.38(S) 10.74 11.21(S)
None E 4 7.86 9.29(1) 7.66(S) 8.02 7.67(S) 10.80 10.96 11.24(S) 10.63 11.24(s)
'" None M 2 5.35 7.60(1) 5.75(1) 6.10(1) 5.39 12.96 !4.74(S) 12.55(1 ) 13.57(S) 12.40(1) '"
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(s) • Stabilizing at a confidenc~ level of .95.
(I) • Inferior at a confidence level of .95.
The control polley fixes the nominal monetary base. Values ~re the means of the natural logs of the
variances of real output and the price level. All price Jeve) values have a negative sign, indicatIng
that the mean ~arlance I~ less tha~ one.TJ\JlLE A-6
MONETARI5T ECONOMY WITH INTERE5T RATE RULE AT ONE-HALF
Effect on Real Output Effect on Price Level
~ ... u o c
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(s) • Stabilizing at a confidence level of .95.
(I) a Inferior at a confidence level of .95.
The control policy fixes the nominal monetary base. Values are the means of the natural logs of
the variances of real output and the price level. Atl price Jevel values ,have a negative sign, Indicating
that the mean variance Is less than one.•
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DERIVATION DF POLICY EQUATIONS
Derivation of Policy for Interest Rate Target
From the model, substituting Equations 5 and 6 into 7 and collect-
iog terms:
(30) h (~) = ~ + j
[
P -P ] Y-T - H· B -I -2
(p) + k(W + P + Pr) - (q + .) r + 4e P-
2
Open market operationS_do not affect Y-T, P, or e[P-~~:-2] in the
current period, hence these terms are considered as exogenously given
for the current period total differential. Multiplying through by P
and taking the total differential yields:
(31) hdH = kdH dr - (qH) dr
In open market operations, since high-powered money is exchanged
for bonds, dB/r ~ -dH for small changes. Sbustituting into (31) and
collecting terms yields:
~B (32) hdH = -i7 +. q + ~ dr
At this point, it is useful to substitute the average level of
bonds for B and the average interest rate for r in the above equation.
This will make possible the evaluation of the differential at the mid-
point of the discreet change rather than at the beginning point, and•
28






:::: -dH. it follows that average B = B_
1
- 1/2 rdH. Average r =
Substituting both of these into (32) and collecting terms
Solving for dH and converting to difference equation form yields:
(34) ~
4kB 1 ~ H-H ='- - +q+!
-] (T+)2 r r _I h-k
T r -r-1
T r -r-]
From Equation 10 of the model,
(35) H - H
-]
Substituting <3S) into (34) and solving for f yields:
(36) + q
Equation (36) determines the value of IIfll for targeting the real
rate of interest, rT
Derivation of Policy for Money Supply Target
Taking the total differential of the money supply function of the•
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model and multiplying through by P, yields:
(37) dMs = h dH + q dr
Solving for dr in Equation (32) and substituting into (37):
(38) dMs = h dH - h dH
+ q + 9.
(39)
Converting to difference equation form and substituting (35) into
(39) yields:
(40) I -
+ q + 9.
-1
It is not feasible in this case to use midpoint values for rand
B. since the midpoint of r is itself a function of IIfll and any attempted
substitution creates a very complex higher ordered equation. However,
through trial and error it was found that substituting the end point
H for H_ 1 in (ltO) significantly improved its accuracy. The substitution
tends to compensate for the inaccuracies introduced by using beginning
point rather than midpoint values for rand B. From Equation (35)
(41) H = (1 + f) H_
l
Letting the right-hand side of (40) equal ~ and substituting the•
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value of H from Equation (41) into H_
1
of Equation (40) (the latter is
an ad hoc substitution, not a mathematical operation), yields:
(42) hH_
1
(1 + f) f : ~
Solving for f:
(43) -1 +}l +~
f hH_1
: ------'-'2-----..:..
Equation (43) with ~ defined as the right-hand side of (40). deter-
mines the value of IIfH for targeting the nominal money supply, M T. s31
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